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THE STORY OF A CHARACTER: ESTABLISHING THE LIMITS OF
INDEPENDENT COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR LITERARY
CHARACTERS
SAMUEL J. COE*
INTRODUCTION
A work of literary fiction does not easily adapt itself to the legal
framework of intellectual property. Every story involves a complex ar-
rangement of plot, setting, dialogue, tone, and characters. Copyright law
allows an author to protect the expression of his ideas within a work to
ensure the unique arrangements of these literary elements are not exploited
by another party, while leaving the ideas themselves in the public domain.'
This protection provides a financial incentive for authors to contribute new
artistic creations to the cultural landscape, while leaving future authors free
to incorporate similar ideas into their own creations.2 The distinction be-
tween expression and idea is often blurred, however, when copyright in-
fringement claims focus on one particular element of a literary work: the
fictional character.
When copyright law attempts to isolate and protect a character outside
the context of its greater literary work, several problems arise. For exam-
ple, picture a well-known fictional character such as James Bond. Originat-
ing in the popular spy-novels of Ian Fleming, James Bond has continued on
to enormous commercial success and world-wide recognition through sev-
eral Hollywood films. 3 One court decision has even discussed the "various
character traits that are specific to Bond-i.e., his cold-bloodedness; his
* J.D., 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; B.A., 2006, Wes-
leyan University. The author would like to thank Professor Edward Harris, Professor Christopher
Buccafusco, and the entire Chicago-Kent Law Review staff for their invaluable help with this note. The
author would also like to give special thanks to his family for their steadfast support and encourage-
ment.
1. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
2. Id.
3. Originally created in 1953, Fleming featured the character in twelve novels and two short
story collections. The Bond character has since been featured in twenty-two films, becoming the
second-highest grossing film series in history. See Preet Banerjee, Highest Grossing Movies ofAll Time,
WHEREDOESALLMYMONEDYGo.coM (Aug. 9, 2009), http://wheredoesallmymoneygo.com/highest-
grossing-movies-of-all-time/.
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overt sexuality; his love of martinis 'shaken, not stirred;' his marksman-
ship; his 'license to kill' and use of guns; his physical strength; his sophis-
tication." 4 These traits define the character of Bond, but traits such as these
are rarely illustrated without the accompanying literary context. If James
Bond is removed from international adventure and placed in a supermarket
or an office-building with no villains to fight or women to seduce, would
he still be the same character? A fictional character does not exist within a
vacuum; some context is essential.
Courts have established two contrasting methods to determine whether
a literary character deserves copyright protection independent from the
context of the work in which it appears. The first approach has been articu-
lated as the "distinctly delineated" test, which asks whether a character has
been sufficiently developed within the author's expression to merit inde-
pendent copyright protection. 5 This abstract test has proven difficult to
apply, leading courts to often focus on whether the character is worthy of
independent protection, rather than whether the alleged infringing party has
actually copied the author's original expression of ideas. 6 The alternative
method for determining whether a character should receive copyright pro-
tection is known as the "story being told" test, which limits copyright pro-
tection to those characters which embody the story in which they appear.7
This approach has received much criticism for being too restrictive,8 but it
maintains the primary focus on the entire literary work, rather than its indi-
vidual components. While other similar methods have been developed by
federal circuits to evaluate pictorial characters, 9 courts are still forced to
choose between or combine these opposing copyright tests for literary cha-
racters, leaving them subject to inconsistent and unreliable protection.o
The uneven scope of protection given to characters under these two
tests also influences how courts compare alleged character copies in copy-
right infringement claims. To support a claim of infringement, there must
4. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
5. See Jasmina Zecevic, Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters that Constitute the Story
Being Told: Who Are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright Protection?, 8 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 365, 370 (2006) (discussing the evolution of the "distinctly delineated" test).
6. See Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L. REV.
429, 438 (1986).
7. See Kathryn M. Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the Elusive Trade-
mark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REVIEW 921, 929-32 (2009) (discussing the evolution of the
"story being told" test).
8. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (Matthew
Bender & Co. ed. 2009).
9. Id.
10. See Kurtz, supra note 6, at 462-63.
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be substantial similarity between the author's original work and the alleged
copy." Courts generally compare the objective elements of the two works,
such as plot, setting, and characters, as well as a more subjective compari-
son of the overall impression of each work. 12 However, when a literary
character becomes the "work" that is allegedly being infringed, the reader
is asked to consider the narrow similarity between two characters, rather
than the overall impression of how those characters' accompanying stories
compare. The test for substantial similarity is inherently resistant to the
comparison of two characters outside the context in which they are pre-
sented to the reader. While a cartoon or comic-book character may be easi-
ly identifiable by itself, literary characters are born of the story that
surrounds them.13 In other words, one cannot determine if James Bond has
been copied without considering the story the James Bond copy appears in.
Because of the inconsistent consideration of context in the current cir-
cuit split, literary characters are often overprotected to the point where
future authors are restricted from using similar character types in artistic
expressions that ultimately bear little resemblance to the original work.14
Such an expansive application of copyright protection actually runs con-
trary to the goals of intellectual property by withholding ideas from being
used in new literary compositions.15 A resolution is required that protects
an author's right to retain reasonable control of his literary creations, while
permitting future authors to use these influences and ideas for their own
artistic expressions. The "story being told" test meets both criteria. Follow-
ing this approach, copyright protection will be reserved for dominant cha-
racter portraits, leaving remaining character expressions under the shelter
of protection provided for the greater work in which they appear. This ar-
rangement will resolve the difficulty courts have experienced when apply-
ing the expansive "distinctly delineated" test, while ensuring that copyright
protection remains focused on the statutory "literary work," leaving com-
ponent ideas free to use in new literary creations.
Part I of this note examines the inherent goals of intellectual property
and the statutory foundation of copyright law. Part II discusses the histori-
cal approach to literary characters in copyright law and the development of
the "distinctly delineated" and the "story being told" tests. Part III demon-
11. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1297 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
12. Id.
13. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978).
14. See Kurtz, supra note 6, at 456-57.
15. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir.
1954).
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strates the shortcomings of the "distinctly delineated" test and the dangers
of over-protecting literary characters. Part IV identifies several benefits to
limiting the scope of independent protection for literary characters. Part V
presents an argument that the "story being told" test and the underlying
copyright of the greater literary work are the only protection required for
the promotion of copyright interests.
I. GOALS OF COPYRIGHT LAW & STATUTORY FOUNDATION
An author's right to control the use of his literary creations is based on
the constitutional recognition that intellectual property rights are required
to encourage the creation of the arts. 16 By granting a limited monopoly in a
new creation, "an important public purpose may be achieved."' 7 The pri-
mary purpose "is not to reward the labor of authors," but to promote the
"[p]rogress" of intellectual contributions to society.18 As the Supreme
Court has stated, intellectual property rights provide special incentives
which are "intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inven-
tors."19
In copyright law, these special incentives come in the form of a bundle
of exclusive rights to the owner of a copyrighted work. 20 These rights in-
clude the right to publish, copy, and distribute the work, as well as the right
to prevent other authors from exploiting copies of that work.21 While a
great amount of legal control is granted for a copyrighted work, this protec-
tion only extends to the original expression of ideas within that work, not
the ideas themselves. 22 The idea/expression dichotomy is one of the most
important pillars of copyright law, marking the border between what is
eligible for copyright protection and what must remain in the public do-
main. Accordingly, "copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and infor-
mation conveyed by a work."23 As the Supreme Court has summarized,
"copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of know-
ledge." 24
16. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .").
17. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
18. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
19. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
21. Id.
22. Id § 102(b).
23. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50.
24. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
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To be eligible for copyright protection, an author's work must be an
"original work[] of authorship." 25 The originality requirement is satisfied
when a work is "independently created" by an author and contains "some
minimal degree of creativity." 26 While some minimal amount of creativity
can be found in most works, it becomes far more difficult to determine
when an author's use of existing artistic influences begins to violate the
"independent" creation requirement. Future authors are clearly prohibited
from making interchangeable copies of previous works, but the
idea/expression dichotomy recognizes that some level of appropriation is
natural in the creative process. As Justice Story remarked long ago,
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if
any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used be-
fore.27
Every author is influenced by some previous works and the reflections of
those influences will always be found to some extent within his or her own
creations. As Arnold Weinstein, a literature professor, recently declared,
"The concept of authorship as a controlling authority is intellectually bo-
gus .... Literature constantly reworks older things -- authors send their
characters out into the world."28 Copyright law is built on the understand-
ing that some flexibility is inherent to the concept of originality.
In furtherance of these principles, one of the specific categories of ar-
tistic creation selected for protection under copyright law is "literary
works."29 The Copyright Act defines "literary work" as a written expres-
sion of words or numbers, such as that found in "books, periodicals, [or]
manuscripts," thus keeping the focus on the overall completed product in
which the work is "embodied." 30 A completed piece of literature may con-
tain any combination of the traditional narrative elements found in written
stories, including plot, setting, characters, and any number of supplemental
features and stylistic touches, all working together to animate the overall
story.
Recognizing the potential for future authors to seek greater protection
for their works by dissecting them into smaller pieces, the drafters of the
Copyright Act have declined to provide categorical protection for charac-
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
26. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
27. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C. Mass. 1845).
28. Julie Steinberg, Literature: Holden Caulfield, Grumpy Old Man?, WALL ST. J., Jul. 9, 2009, at
D7.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
30. Id. § 101.
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ters themselves. The Copyright Office Code of Regulations explicitly states
that "[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans" are not
subject to copyright protection, leaving character names outside the scope
of protection.31 Proposals to extend categorical protection for fictional cha-
racters continue to be rejected by legislators. As the Register of Copyrights
explained in a 1965 report:
Proposals have been advanced for identifying fictional characters as co-
pyrightable works in themselves under the bill. There are undoubtedly
some characters that are developed in detail and with such breadth and
depth that they emerge as separately identifiable parts of the copyrighted
works in which they appear. Others, perhaps the large majority, cannot
be said to represent independent creations apart from the particular lite-
rary or pictorial works depicting them. As is equally true in the case of
detailed presentations of plot, setting, or dramatic action, we believe it
would be unnecessary and misleading to specify fictional characters as a
separate class of copyrightable works.32
This statement illustrates that the administrator charged with advising Con-
gress on copyright policy and procedure33 has thoroughly considered the
implications of granting characters copyright protection and decided in-
stead to rely on the protection of the greater work in which they appear.
Commentators who argue that a new category of protectable subject
matter should be added for fictional characterS34 focus on the fact that those
listed in the Copyright Act are "illustrative and not limitative." 35 While the
drafters of the Act intended to provide courts with some flexibility in the
scope of these categories, Congress has primarily recognized new catego-
ries to include different mediums of expression.36 Adding a new category
for fictional characters would redefine the existing category of "literary
works," rather than recognize any new category of artistic expression. The
work of written literature is one of the oldest recognized forms of intellec-
tual property and the character's role in that medium has not changed from
the inception of copyright law. Accordingly, literary characters remain
31. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2010).
32. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN. REVISION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 6 (Comm. Print
1965).
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
34. See David B. Feldman, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change in
Copyright Protection, 78 CAL. L. REV. 687, 711 (1990) (discussing several scholarly and judicial
proposals for a fictional character category).
35. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976).
36. See Feldman, supra note 34 ("For example, in 1972, it established a separate category for
sound recordings in response to increasing common law protection. Similarly, the 1976 Act implicitly
recognized the importance of performance arts by making special provisions for pantomimes and
choreographic works.") (footnote omitted).
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inextricably linked to the greater "literary work" structure and must be
considered in relation to this category of protection.
The fundamental goal of copyright is to incentivize the "progress" of
creative works available to society. To serve that end, copyright law en-
sures authors that the original expression they produce will not be unfairly
exploited after it is presented to the public. Conversely, copyright law also
recognizes that providing too much protection will actually disable future
authors from using existing influences in the production of new works. The
continued reluctance to create a separate category of copyright for charac-
ters themselves illustrates that Congress has determined this protection
should focus on the greater works in which characters appear, rather than
the characters themselves. Since copyright law does not allow an author to
monopolize ideas or prohibit others from using all of the elements em-
ployed within a work, it is essential to maintain the integrity of a literary
work when claims of infringement arise.
II. HISTORICAL APPROACH TO LITERARY CHARACTERS
The basic principle that a literary character may warrant independent
copyright protection was first suggested by the Second Circuit in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.37 In Nichols, a playwright brought an infringe-
ment claim against the makers of the motion picture "The Cohens and The
Kellys," which had a similar premise to his play "Abie's Irish Rose." 38
Both works portray the marriage of a young couple and resulting conflict
between their Irish-Catholic and Jewish families, yet the court found too
many differences between the story, theme, and characters to support an
infringement claim.39 In that opinion, Judge Learned Hand rather casually
advanced the idea that characters may be entitled to copyright protection
"independently of the 'plot' proper."40 He went on to reason that "the less
developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penal-
ty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly." 4 1
This statement prompted the development of the "distinctly deli-
neated" test in the Second Circuit, whereby sufficient development of any
literary character may entitle it to independent copyright protection. 42
37. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2nd Cir. 1930).
38. Id. at 120-21.
39. Id. at 122.
40. Id. at 121.
41. Id.
42. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8.
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Subsequent decisions divide the "distinctly delineated" test into a two-
part analysis. 43 The first step determines whether the character has been
originally conceived and sufficiently delineated to warrant independent
copyright protection.44 The second step incorporates the substantial similar-
ity analysis, looking to the alleged infringing work to determine if there has
been substantial copying of the original character or "merely a broader and
more abstract outline." 45 This "distinctly delineated" analysis provides a
broad scope of protection, yet no solid guidelines for how to measure a
character's development or a benchmark for the point at which a character
transcends a general idea into the realm of protectable expression.46
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow this reasoning and developed the
"story being told" test for determining whether a character is entitled to
independent copyright protection. 47 In Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the court reasoned that if Congress had
intended for characters to have copyright protection outside the work they
appear in, then Congress would have made such a provision.48 That case
involved an author, Dashiell Hammett, who granted Warner Brothers the
exclusive rights to his classic detective novel, "The Maltese Falcon."49
Warner Brothers later brought suit when Hammett used the novel's main
character, Sam Spade, in subsequent detective stories.50 The court ruled in
favor of Hammett, stating that the "characters were vehicles for the story
told, and the vehicles did not go with the sale of the story." 51 Although the
author had assigned his rights to the literary work, copyright protection did
not extend to the component character of Sam Spade.
In reaching this decision, the court noted that there are certain cir-
cumstances in which a character could warrant independent copyright pro-
tection.52 As the court declared, "It is conceivable that the character really
constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only the chessman in
the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection af-
forded by the copyright."53 Thus, the Ninth Circuit limited the scope of
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Zecevic, supra note 5, at 372-73.
47. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954)
(explicitly noting that the issue was given consideration by the Second Circuit in Nichols, yet proceed-
ing to take the more restrictive approach).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 948.
50. Id
51. Id at 950.
52. Id
53. Id
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copyright protection available for literary characters to instances in which
the character closely reflects the work itself. In fashioning this "story being
told" test, the court recognized that over-protection of characters "would
effect the very opposite of the [copyright] statute's purpose which is to
encourage the production of the arts."54 Since the Nichols decision, the
Ninth Circuit has granted broader protection for most visually-depicted
characters,55 but the "story-being told" test remains the standard for literary
characters and continues to be employed in the analysis of many fictional
characters in other mediums.56
While literary characters may not seem as popular or influential as
they used to be, the majority of fictional characters, whether they are pre-
sented in film or television, are still usually first conceived in written depic-
tions. Written characters are crucial to the process of storytelling, allowing
each reader to interpret them in his own unique way. This intangible nature
is what gives them their artistic value, while making them elusive to any
rigid copyright regime. The two major tests that have been articulated to
confront this issue of character copyright protection have each been criti-
cized and applied inconsistently by courts. A resolution is required between
the two methods to ensure that courts do not overlook the basic interests of
copyright in their attempts to protect literary characters independent from
their original works.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE "DISTINCTLY DELINEATED" TEST AND THE
RISK OF OVER-PROTECTION
One of the practical problems with the "distinctly delineated" test is its
unreliable judicial application and tendency to over-protect literary charac-
ters. 57 The Second Circuit standard asks judges to assume the role of lite-
rary critic in their analysis of characters within a work.58 In trying to
measure the development of a character, the court often isolates the charac-
ter and disregards the importance of context.
54. Id.
55. In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), the court determined
that cartoon characters are entitled to independent copyright protection. In reaching its decision, the
court reasoned that "while many literary characters may embody little more than an unprotected idea, a
comic book character, which has physical as well as conceptual qualities, is more likely to contain some
unique elements of expression." Id at 755 (citation omitted). When characters are depicted in graphic
representations, the distinction between idea and expression is easier to identify and copyright protec-
tion is more generally available for pictorial characters than "word portraits." NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 8.
56. See Olson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1988); NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 8.
57. See Zecevic, supra note 5, at 372.
58. Kurtz, supra note 6, at 440.
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The earlier James Bond example 59 illustrated the importance of con-
text in character development, and an even more reductive demonstration is
found in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.60 In that case, the court
held that the character of Tarzan was protectable under the "distinctly deli-
neated" test and provided the following justification: "Tarzan is the ape-
man. He is an individual closely in tune with his jungle environment, able
to communicate with animals yet able to experience human emotions. He is
athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle and strong. He is Tarzan." 61 This de-
scription provides only a faint outline of the character and no indication of
how such broad character traits achieved the legal status of protectable
expression. If a character of this general type is independently protected by
copyright, the use of a similar character type in new artistic creations is
significantly limited. Tarzan himself would likely be an infringement fol-
lowing such an approach due to his general similarity to the jungle-boy
character of Mowgli in Rudyard Kipling's "The Jungle Book." 62
By focusing on how developed a character is, the "distinctly deli-
neated" test has tended to disregard the overall dissimilarity between the
character's greater work and the allegedly infringing work. This problem is
illustrated in Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, a case that involved
an infringement claim over the use of the cowboy character Hopalong Cas-
sidy.63 The court ruled that the character as first portrayed in the Hopalong
Cassidy books was sufficiently delineated for protection and that any use of
the character would constitute infringement "irrespective and independent
of the similarity of the story line."64 By finding infringement in the plain-
tiff's use of the character in a Hopalong Cassidy film, the court disregarded
the clear differences between the book and film versions of the character.65
In the original books, the character was a vulgar and violent sort of ruffian,
while the film version was more of a reserved, clean-living western hero.66
The only real similarity remaining between the characters was the name
and the general western genre setting, both insufficient to support an in-
fringement claim.67 By isolating the character from the context of the story,
59. See supra INTRODUCTION.
60. 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
61. Id. at 391.
62. Rudyard Kipling's "The Jungle Book," featuring Mowgli, was first published in 1894, many
years before Edgar Rice Burroughs introduced Tarzan in the 1914 novel "Tarzan of the Apes."
63. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y 1981), affd in relevant
part, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 66.
65. Kurtz, supra note 6, at 459.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 460.
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the court undermined the traditional infringement comparison, completely
disregarding further consideration of the differences between the overall
impressions of each story.
The problematic separation of character from context under the "dis-
tinctly delineated" test was also recently illustrated in Salinger v. Colting.68
In that case, J.D. Salinger, the recently deceased author of the well-known
novel "The Catcher in the Rye," filed suit against a foreign author claim-
ing, inter alia, that the protagonist of the author's new novel "60 Years
Later" was an infringement of the Holden Caulfield character from "Catch-
er."69 The court held that there was sufficient similarity between Holden
Caulfield and Colting's "Mr. C" character to support the finding of in-
fringement:
Most notably, Defendants have utilized the character of Holden Caul-
field, reanimated as the elderly Mr. C, as the primary protagonist of 60
Years. Mr. C has similar or identical thoughts, memories, and personality
traits to Caulfield, often using precisely the same or only slightly mod-
ified language from that used by Caulfield.70
The court declined to follow the defendant's fair use defense, reasoning
that the extent of similarity went beyond that found in a parody or any oth-
er "transformative" use of Salinger's work.71 The fact that one character is
an old man and the other is a rebellious youth is deemed insufficient to
distinguish them.
While the court reached a finding of character infringement, the
court's additional finding of substantial similarity between the two overall
literary works illustrates that context is essential for the evaluation of a
literary character. Throughout its opinion, the court looks to elements of the
greater literary work to compare the two characters, yet ultimately disre-
gards this context by giving Holden Caulfield independent protection. 72
Aside from the similar protagonists, the court also acknowledges that Colt-
ing's dialogue, setting, tone, supporting characters, and general plot create
a work that "largely mirrors that of Catcher."73 The elderly protagonist is
arguably the most dissimilar element of the infringing novel, yet the court
designates him as an independent infringement. If a character can be re-
drawn as a significantly older individual, with different physical traits and
life-experiences, yet still qualify as an infringement without reference to
the surrounding story, it becomes increasingly difficult to draw the essen-
68. 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
69. Id. at 254.
70. Id at 263.
71. Id
72. Id. at 264.
73. Id.
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tial line between idea and expression. The court's ultimate conclusion illu-
strates that the copying of the Holden Caulfield character was not enough;
it was the copying of the overall Holden Caulfield story that resulted in
infringement. The court's separation of the character from its context only
provides superfluous protection in the overall consideration of the greater
literary works being evaluated.
The Salinger decision illustrates the inherent conflict between the
Second Circuit's approach to character copyright protection and the tradi-
tional analysis of substantial similarity. The court cites Castle Rock Enter-
tainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc. for the "ordinary observer"
test,74 which states that "works are substantially similar where 'the ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to
overlook them and regard [the] aesthetic appeal' as the same in each
work.75 This "ordinary observer" standard asks the court to consider the
aesthetic appeal of the entire work, yet the "distinctly delineated" test asks
it to narrow its focus to the single character's role within that work, regard-
less of how small it may have been in the overall aesthetic impression.
Castle Rock also states another test employed by the Second Circuit when
comparing works from the same genre and media: the "total concept and
feel" test.76 When works are in the same genre, such as two novels, this test
analyzes the "similarities in such aspects as the total concept and feel,
theme, characters, plot, sequence, pace, and setting" of each work.77 By
considering all these elements of a literary work, the substantial similarity
analysis implicitly recognizes that a potentially infringing character must
be considered in relation to the surrounding work before infringement can
be found. Therefore, the "distinctly delineated" test asserts that a character
can be protected independent from its story, yet the corresponding test for
infringement takes the contradictory position that a character cannot be
copied without copying some aspect of its story.
While the Salinger court may have reached the appropriate decision
given the overall similarity of the two works, its assessment of the Holden
Caulfield character opens the door for an expansive new area of potential
infringement. By granting the Holden Caulfield character protection as an
independent work within "The Catcher in the Rye," without establishing
the boundaries of that character, the overall impression of the greater work
has been undermined. Any infringement analysis will now focus on alleged
74. Id. at 254.
75. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1998).
76. Id. at 140.
77. Id.
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similarity with Holden Caulfield, rather than similarity with "The Catcher
in the Rye." Future authors are prevented from continuing Holden Caul-
field's story in any form, even one that produces a substantially different
story. A future author may choose to portray a similarly rebellious and
alienated teenage character and place him in an early historical or even
science-fiction story, yet such characters would also be at risk because the
surrounding story elements would be outside the infringement analysis.
This isolated protection of the character significantly impairs the produc-
tion of future works, essentially creating two works that can be infringed
from the original single literary work.
The analysis of a character's development under the "distinctly deli-
neated" test takes the focus away from the overall impression of the work
by attempting to separate the development of a character from the devel-
opment of the story. Both the Tarzan and Hopalong Cassidy cases illustrate
the problems that occur when attempting to identify a character indepen-
dent from its surrounding story. In isolating characters from their context,
courts have a tendency to outline mere character "types" and neglect a rea-
soned comparison of how similar a potentially infringing character actually
is. In addition, the Salinger case illustrates that once an original character
has been deemed as sufficiently "delineated," courts have a tendency to
further expand that protection to variations of the character that can differ
greatly from the original character. Therefore, the "distinctly delineated"
test puts judges in a very difficult position. As the First Circuit once stated,
"Although we may not be qualified literary critics, [judges] are fitted by
training and experience to compare literary works and determine whether
they evidence substantial similarity." 78 The Second Circuit's approach,
however, asks judges to create a new test of character similarity, outside
the traditional comparison of story similarity. To encourage further artistic
creation and ensure that protection is limited to expression, rather than
ideas, courts must consider a literary character in relation to its surrounding
context.
IV. BENEFITS OF LIMITING INDEPENDENT CHARACTER PROTECTION
The Salinger case illustrates how the over-protection of literary cha-
racters can often run contrary to the underlying copyright goal of promot-
ing new artistic works. In reaching its conclusion, the court follows an
expansive interpretation of when a new literary work can be deemed a "de-
rivative" of an existing work. Copyright law provides that within the exclu-
78. O'Neill v. Dell Publ'g Co., 630 F.2d 685, 690 (1st Cir. 1980).
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sive bundle of rights granted to an author is the right to create derivative
works,79 which generally means the freedom to create a new work based
upon the original work.80 While adaptations of novels into films or a re-
cording of an existing song in a new music form are obvious derivative
works, the issue becomes far more difficult when the dispute is centered on
one literary character being "based" off another. As discussed earlier, the
idea/expression dichotomy and the influence of the cultural marketplace
upon artistic creation make it difficult to determine whether an author bases
a character on protected expression or an unprotected idea. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the "licensing of derivatives is an important eco-
nomic incentive to the creation of originals." 81 However, the potential val-
ue of derivative works must not be used as an excuse to extend control over
the elements of a literary work that are outside the scope of copyright pro-
tection. The legal standard for determining whether a work is "derivative"
must focus on the greater literary work that has been given protection, not
the component ideas within it.
By relying on economic incentives for the creation of new works,
courts often compromise the underlying copyright goals they are claiming
to promote. The Salinger court states that its decision is consistent with the
underlying copyright goal of promoting the arts "because some artists may
[have] further incentiv[e] to create original works due to the availability of
the right not to produce any sequels." 82 While it is reasonable that authors
may be discouraged from creating new works if others could make a sequel
without their authorization, this reasoning does not extend to all uses of
characters. Sequels typically contain most, if not all, the characters from an
original work, as well as similar themes, plotting, and other elements from
the original. Authors are not entitled to control every element within their
works just because they intend to use it again in a sequel, regardless of how
much an incentive that may be for them to create new works. Copyright
law does not allow authors to stockpile every character or literary element
contained in their works, such a position limits the production of new artis-
tic works. By imposing a monopoly on literary characters, especially the
abstract, aged variations of characters, like the one examined in Salinger,
courts significantly limit the building blocks available to future authors.
It is important to remember that the underlying purpose of copyright
law is to promote the generation of new artistic works, not to allow current
79. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
80. Id. § 101.
81. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994).
82. Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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copyright holders to squeeze every drop of value from the popularity of
ideas presented in their existing works. Judge Learned Hand recognized
this important distinction in the Nichols decision itself.83 In concluding that
no infringement existed between the two works in that case, he recognized
that only the author's expression is entitled to copyright protection, regard-
less of how valuable the ideas within that expression may be: "Though the
plaintiff discovered the vein, she could not keep it to herself."84 While J.D.
Salinger and his heirs can prevent others from copying Holden Caulfield's
character, they have no control over every new portrayal of similar rebel-
lious young characters. The history of entertainment illustrates these chang-
ing trends in character types. Copyright law encourages authors to use
existing character ideas in new works and the entertainment business illu-
strates these trends in popular character types, from spies and pirates to
vampires and werewolves. These characters are always bound to be similar
to each other, but the literary work in which they appear is what outlines
the protection provided by copyright. By limiting the scope of character
protection and keeping the focus on the overall literary work, new works
are encouraged without sacrificing any of the author's rights in his existing
expression.
The Salinger court's decision also illustrates that the fair use defense
is often insufficient to protect the transformative use of literary charac-
ters. 85 The fair use doctrine allows for the use of existing copyrighted
works in such formats as critical reviews, academic scholarship, and paro-
dy,86 the latter being a new work which, "at least in part," comments on the
original author's work.87 In determining whether a new work may be
deemed a parody and not an infringement, courts put great emphasis on
whether the new work is transformative, that is whether the new work
merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation" or "instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message."88 The fair use doctrine
acknowledges the importance of transformative works, but does not pro-
vide courts with much guidance to identify these works.
Courts have primarily recognized fair use when characters are used in
new genres aimed at different audiences. This kind of transformative use
can provide valuable social and political commentary, as found in Suntrust
83. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
84. Id.
85. Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
87. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
88. Id. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
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Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 89 In that case, an author used large portions
of "Gone with the Wind" without infringement, writing them from the
perspective of a minor character from the original story to comment on the
contemporary racial dynamics of the original.90 The transformative nature
of a parody can also provide cultural commentary by recasting a popular
work in a comedic nature, such as James Bond inspiring the Austin Powers
series of films.
While these character uses often result in profound transformations,
there are also far more subtle ways to comment upon and transform a cha-
racter which the fair use doctrine has been reluctant to recognize. Whether
James Bond is placed in a comedic situation or a court-room drama, the
author is using the idea of the character to create a new expression. As the
Supreme Court stated, "the goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works."91
However, the Salinger decision illustrates that the more independent pro-
tection given to literary characters, the less room for transformative use
remains.92 Future authors should not have to criticize or make fun of Hol-
den Caulfield if they simply want to continue the character's development
in a transformative new story. Because fair use provides little protection for
authors who want to use character ideas with similar artistic "purpose" in
mind,93 over-protecting those character ideas significantly impairs authors'
abilities to make new contributions to a popular existing genre.
In rejecting the fair use defense, the Salinger court puts a great deal of
emphasis on the adverse impact that Colting's novel would have on the
original "Catcher in the Rye." 94 The Supreme Court has stated that evi-
dence of "substantial harm" to the market weighs against fair use, meaning
the harm of "market substitution."95 The Salinger court reasons that since
an author may wish to leave the future of a character's story in the imagina-
tion of his readers, an unauthorized "sequel" like Colting's will harm the
"potential market" for derivative works. 96 However, the potential harm
identified by the court is not really market substitution because the focus is
put on the author, rather than the market. It is extremely unlikely that a
consumer would ever purchase "60 Years Later" instead of "Catcher in the
89. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
90. Id
91. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
92. Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
93. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
94. Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 267-68.
95. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
96. Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
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Rye" or that its availability would have any adverse impact on the public's
desire for a sequel from Salinger. In fact, the subsequent use of characters
in new stories would logically have the reciprocal effect of increasing the
exposure and demand for the original work they appear in. Many commen-
tators have noted this effect in the modem proliferation of online "fan fic-
tion" sites, in which new uses of existing characters promotes their
popularity and encourages further production. 97 The Salinger court oper-
ates under the unrealistic assumption that most readers would accredit one
author's use of a character to a different author. If one author were attempt-
ing to pass his literary characters off as those of another writer, or causing
general consumer confusion regarding who is behind a certain literary
work, the original author would have a remedy in trademark and unfair-
competition law. 98 However, once one author creates the market for a cer-
tain kind of character, copyright law should provide the same measure of
limited control over that market that it gives an author over the character
idea itself.
As the duration of copyright protection continues to expand, limited
recognition for literary characters also ensures that free expression is not
suppressed. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court recently held the
expansive twenty-year extension of copyright terms under the Copyright
Term Extension Act was not a violation of the constitutional requirement
that intellectual property rights only last for "limited times."99 The Court
reasoned that the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine act as
"built-in First Amendment accommodations" within copyright law.100 As
the public domain continues to shrink in response to pressure from existing
copyright holders, these copyright safeguards must be maintained to ensure
there is still freedom for artists to make new contributions without fear of
infringement lawsuits. Setting stringent standards for the independent copy-
right of literary characters will promote these principles by leaving the
component ideas of a literary work in the public domain for new authors to
build upon.
97. See Aaron Schwabach, The Harry Potter Lexicon and the World of Fandom: Fan Fiction,
Outsider Works, and Copyright, 70 U. PIT. L. REV. 387 (2009); Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the
Culture of the Masses: A Manfesto for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921
(2009).
98. See Kurtz, supra note 6, at 474-506 (discussing various case examples in which Trademark
and Unfair Competition laws have protected characters from appropriation).
99. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
100. Id at 219.
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V. ADVANTAGES OF THE "STORY BEING TOLD" TEST
The Ninth Circuit's development of the "story being told" test illu-
strates how context can be incorporated in the determination of copyright
protection for literary characters. Rather than attempting to isolate a charac-
ter and consider its development independent from the greater development
of the story, this approach requires a court to consider them together. When
a character's role in a particular literary work is so dominant that it embo-
dies the development of the story, only then is independent protection war-
ranted. 01 The "story being told" test provides a reliable model that courts
can apply in both the determination of whether a character should be pro-
tected and the subsequent substantial similarity analysis for infringement
claims. This approach maintains the focus on the entire "literary work,"
leaving the building blocks free for future authors to use in accordance with
the idea/expression dichotomy and copyright law's underlying goal of artis-
tic progress.
Critics have argued that the "story being told" test makes it very diffi-
cult to grant independent protection for a literary character,102 but a higher
standard does not equal a flawed standard. The very fact that characters
have been expressly excluded from categorical copyright protection illu-
strates that a story's characters were not intended to have protection outside
the literary work in most circumstances. Professor Nimmer argues that this
standard "seems to envisage a 'story' devoid of plot, wherein character
study constitutes all, or substantially all, of the work." 03 He continues that
there would only be "rare examples" of such a character, concluding that
this would effectively exclude all literary characters from independent pro-
tection. 104 However, the application of this test in the Ninth Circuit illu-
strates that this is not an insurmountable standard to satisfy. As the court
stated in Warner Bros., a character must be more than a "chessman" or a
"vehicle[]" for the story.' 05 This conceptual basis provides a far more ac-
cessible model than that left by Judge Learned Hand's elusive contention
that a character must be somehow sufficiently "developed" for protection.
There are many scenarios in which literary characters will sufficiently con-
stitute the story in which they appear.
101. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
102. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950.
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The James Bond example illustrates how a well-known, primary cha-
racter can satisfy the "story being told" test. 106 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., the producer of several James Bond
films brought an infringement claim against Honda's use of a Bond-like
character in one of its car commercials.1 07 The commercial in question
featured a debonair, tuxedo-clad man driving a sports car with a glamorous
woman while they are being chased by a helicopter and a menacing vil-
lain. 08 The court starts its analysis by outlining the several Bond character
traits discussed earlier, traits that have been developed over the many
books and films that he has appeared in.109 This initial identification of the
character is quite similar to how courts begin the "distinctly delineated"
test. However, after identifying the superficial traits of the Bond character,
the court goes on to evaluate his role in the greater works he has appeared
in and how that context further defines the character.110 The court notes
how the character is often presented in a dangerous chase setting, flirting
with women, and using witty dialogue. 1 These contextual story elements
influence how the character relates to the story and ultimately become part
of the character as he is conceived in the minds of readers and viewers.
Concluding that Bond is the actual "story being told," the court reasons that
"audiences do not watch Tarzan, Superman, Sherlock Holmes, or James
Bond for the story, they watch these films to see their heroes at work. A
James Bond film without James Bond is not a James Bond film."ll 2 This
practical, common-sense approach illustrates that famous and dominant
characters, especially those developed through a series of progressive de-
pictions, are more likely to pass the "story being told" test. Much like a
Hollywood "star vehicle," characters in these situations are not vehicles to
tell the story; the story is a vehicle to showcase the famous character.
Famous and repeatedly portrayed characters are not the only ones that
satisfy the "story being told" test. In Bach v. Forever Living Products, the
author of the children's book "Jonathan Livingston Seagull" brought an
infringement claim against a beauty product company's use of the title
character and his story in its advertising, promotional, and training mate-
rials.11 3 The story is a little-known tale of an ambitious, anthropomorphic
106. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1292.
109. Id. at 1296.
110. Id. at 1297-98.
1I1. Id at 1298.
112. Id. at 1296.
113. Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
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seagull, and the defendants not only used an identically named seagull as
their logo, they explicitly summarized and used the story of the character's
arduous rise to greatness as an allegory for how the business sought to op-
erate. 114 Despite the character's relative obscurity, the court found the cha-
racter satisfied the "story being told" test and was therefore entitled to
protection from infringement, even infringement in such a different form of
media.11 5 As the court states, "He is the title character in a book that is
entirely about his development from an ordinary seagull to an extraordinary
one."116 The court follows a comprehensive approach to the character,
looking to how it is related to the plot, setting, and other characters of the
story.11 7 Finding that so many aspects of the literary work are closely tied
to the Jonathan Livingston Seagull character, the court concluded that he
was entitled to independent protection."18 Therefore, a character does not
have to be as famous or repeatedly portrayed as James Bond to constitute
the "story being told."
The "story being told" test can also be applied to prohibit the unautho-
rized use of a greater ensemble of characters that accompany a primary
character. In Anderson v. Stallone, a writer sought copyright protection for
a screenplay that he had written using Rocky Balboa, Adrian Balboa, Apol-
lo Creed, and Paulie Pennino, in the hopes that the story would be used as
the fourth installment of the "Rocky" film franchise.1 9 Since the writer did
not have permission to use these characters, the court found the screenplay
to be an unauthorized derivative work that was not entitled to protection
because of the pervasive use of these "central" characters.120 In reaching its
conclusion, the court determined the characters satisfied the "story being
told" test because the three prior "Rocky movies focused on the develop-
ment and relationships of the various characters. The movies did not re-
volve around intricate plots or story lines."1 21 The court did not need to
"reach the issue of whether any single character alone, apart from Rocky,"
would be entitled to independent protection.122 Few viewers of the
"Rocky" films would be likely to argue that any of the supporting charac-
ters constitute the "story" of Rocky by themselves, but when these support-
114. Id
115. Id at 1136.
116. Id.
117. Id
118. Id.
119. Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1989).
120. Id at *8.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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ing characters accompany Rocky, it is far easier for courts to identify the
"story being told" within that ensemble. When this group of characters is
transplanted together in a new work, substantial similarity between the two
works will often be an easy conclusion to reach. The supporting characters
act as contextual support for the primary character, and the more context
that is borrowed along with the primary character, the more likely there
will be infringement between the two overall stories.
The Anderson court's flexibility to provide protection for a pair or en-
semble of characters within the "story being told" test illustrates an impor-
tant evolution of the standard from its original conception. In the original
Warner Bros. case, Sam Spade was reproduced by the author along with
other characters from "The Maltese Falcon." 23 The court brushes over this
fact, but there is an important difference between declining to find one
character constitutes the story being told and finding that no combination of
characters could. This recognition is necessary to maintain the focus on the
entire work and what elements sufficiently compose the "story being told."
In Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., the Ninth Circuit faced a claim
of infringement that addressed alleged ensemble character infringement
more directly.124 In that case, the author of an adventure television pilot
brought an infringement claim against the television series "The A-
Team." 25 The court declined to find infringement due to the minimal simi-
larity between the plot and setting, as well as the mere "loose correspon-
dences among the characters of the two works."1 26 The court noted that the
Warner Bros. decision declined to give protection to the Sam Spade group
of characters, but the decision does not specifically address whether the
"A-Team" characters may together constitute the "story being told." 27 The
Anderson and Olson decisions reflect a movement towards the collective
analysis of characters and an important step towards recognizing protection
for ensembles which embody the greater "story," however many characters
that may take to compose. This approach will protect authors from the ap-
propriation of groups of characters that may not be entitled to protection
individually, yet ultimately constitute the "story being told" when they are
together. It will also allow more peripheral characters, such as Clubber
Lang from "Rocky III" or B.A. Baracus from "The A-Team," to enter the
public domain for future authors to portray in new stories independently
123. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1954).
124. Olson v. Nat'1 Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1451.
127. Id. at 1453.
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from their original ensembles, rather than remaining unutilized and locked
in copyright.
By removing the highly subjective initial inquiry of how "developed"
a character is, the Ninth Circuit's approach allows courts to focus on the
big picture of the literary work, rather than a catalog of character traits that
appear within it. A standard that asks courts to protect characters at a level
below the "story being told" is bound to pick apart abstract elements of an
author's written expression. Lists that rely on superficial similarities are
unreliable and misleading when trying to gauge how a character is ulti-
mately conceived by a reader. 128 The Olson court even noted the futile
nature of infringement claims "based upon comparisons as tenuous as those
concerning the tennis shoes worn by characters in the two works."129 The
court decisions analyzing James Bond and Jonathan Livingston Seagull did
not stop their determination of independent protection with a listing of
character traits, they went on to consider how important those character
traits are to the overall literary works. All fictional characters, especially
those portrayed in "word portraits," need the story to exist, but protection
should be limited to those characters which are essential for the story to
exist.
Once independent protection has been granted, the "story being told"
test complements the analysis of copyright infringement by asking whether
there is substantial similarity between the stories, not just the characters.
The Ninth Circuit employs a two-part test to determine whether one work
is substantially similar to another.130 The first step, or "extrinsic test," is an
objective comparison of "virtually every element that may be considered
concrete in a literary work," such as the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, set-
ting, pace, and characters in the two works.131 When these concrete ele-
ments are all closely tied to one character, there is obviously a strong
likelihood of character infringement. The second step of the analysis, or the
"intrinsic test," is a subjective assessment of whether an "ordinary, reason-
able audience" would find the works substantially similar in "total concept
and feel." 32 The mechanics of this substantial similarity analysis are prac-
tically identical to the substantial similarity test employed by the Second
Circuit, yet it works with the test for character copyright protection in a
128. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984) (observing the unreliability of
lists which rely on random similarities).
129. Olson, 855 F.2d at 1450 n.3.
130. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002).
131. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
132. Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822 (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042,
1045 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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much different way. Because the "distinctly delineated" test isolates a cha-
racter from the story, it conflicts with the substantial similarity analysis and
results in a comparison of only the characters involved, thus neglecting to
compare the overall impression of the stories they appear in. The "story
being told" test, on the other hand, is basically asking the same questions as
the substantial similarity analysis. Under the "story being told" test, a find-
ing of substantial similarity between the characters is equivalent to substan-
tial similarity between the stories.
The court's finding of character infringement in the James Bond case
illustrates this harmony between the "story being told" test and the substan-
tial similarity analysis. Once the character's relationship to the story is used
to grant independent protection, those same contextual elements are used in
the comparison of the allegedly infringing character. The court first notes
that Bond and the Honda commercial character are "similar in the way they
look and act-both heros [sic] are young, tuxedo-clad, British-looking men
with beautiful women in tow and grotesque villains close at hand; moreo-
ver, both men exude uncanny calm under pressure, exhibit a dry sense of
humor and wit, and . .. are attractive." 33 The court focuses on the similari-
ty between both the personal traits of the two characters and the similarity
between the supporting characters, plot, setting, and theme which frame the
two in their respective stories.134 It is not enough to have a character in a
tuxedo, or even a British spy character, but the car-chase setting, the evil
villain in pursuit, and the witty, flirtatious dialogue between the protagonist
and his female companion all work together to produce the substantial si-
milarity between the characters. The court grants the injunction against the
Honda commercial and finds it a likely character infringement because it is
essentially an overall James Bond story in abbreviated form.
This harmonization of the "story being told" test with the substantial
similarity analysis also allows for a dominant character, worthy of inde-
pendent copyright protection, to be used freely by other authors in dissimi-
lar stories. As discussed earlier, an author may choose to place a James
Bond character in a romantic comedy, a court-room drama, or a mundane
office story and it would likely vary from a traditional James Bond story in
many contextual elements and the overall "concept and feel." Even if the
author is not intending to make a parody, whether he is building off the
idea of a character or explicitly attempting to remind the reader of that
133. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
134. Id.
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character, the resulting creative expression is new and different, furthering
the ultimate copyright goal of artistic progress.
One significant illustration of such a situation comes from the con-
temporary use of Sherlock Holmes, a famous literary character noted by
many as the model candidate for protection under the "story being told"
test.13 5 Sherlock Holmes was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in the late
nineteenth century and has enjoyed great popularity and notoriety since
then.136 As first portrayed, he is a highly inquisitive, anti-social, and drug-
addicted detective who uses his powers of observation and deduction to
solve crimes alongside his trusted companion, Watson, in Victorian-Era
London. There have been many modem adaptations of Sherlock Holmes
that follow this traditional story form, including the recent 2009 film "Sher-
lock Holmes." The character has also been explicitly cited as the inspira-
tion for the protagonist in the medical television series "House" by the
show's creator. 137 Dr. Gregory House, played by Hugh Laurie, shares many
character traits with Holmes, including the detached anti-social nature, the
keen observation skills, the methodical approach to every situation as a
puzzle to solve, the drug addiction, and the dependence on a trusted com-
panion. Even the name "House" was created as a "phonetic homage" to
Sherlock Holmes.138 Even with all these similarities, Dr. House's role as a
doctor in a modem American setting produces a significantly different
artistic "concept and feel" than the original Holmes stories. Since Sherlock
Holmes is now in the public domain, the creators of "House" do not need to
fear a character infringement suit. However, with the ever-growing length
of copyright durations and the shrinking public domain, new stories like
this are increasingly threatened by the over-protection of character copy-
rights. By permitting such uses of characters in new and original stories,
the "story being told" test furthers copyright law's goal of promoting new
artistic works, while protecting the actual expression embodied in authors'
existing literary works.
CONCLUSION
As one commentator stated, "The art of storytelling has been around
for thousands of years. And for thousands of years storytellers have been
using the characters in stories they hear to create new stories."1 39 Copyright
135. See Kurtz, supra note 6, at 465.
136. Sherlock Holmes first appeared in 1887, in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's "A Study in Scarlett."
137. See David Mermelstein, Germs, Jerks Infiltrate Primetime, VARIETY (June 15, 2005),
http://www.variety.com/article/VRII I 7924498?refCatld= 1945.
138. Id.
139. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 287 (2d ed. 2006).
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law is designed to incentivize this process of artistic creation, but providing
expansive copyright protection for characters impairs far more creation
than it encourages. The inconsistent protection courts currently give literary
characters requires a solution that advances the underlying copyright goal
of artistic progress. The "story being told" test complements the traditional
infringement analysis, thus ensuring authors retain control over their exist-
ing expression, while providing freedom for new authors to build upon
those stories and ideas in the creation of new literary works.

